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Sidney Reilly's reports from South Russia, December 1918-March 1919. 
John Ainsworth 
 
Sidney Reilly has become a legendary figure as the master spy of the British Secret Intelligence Service 
(MI6). 'He was surely not only the master spy of this century', wrote one ardent admirer, 'but of all time'. 
While his activities as an intelligence agent in British service have only been glimpsed through the veil of 
secrecy that officialdom invariably imposes on such matters, nonetheless, they seem to have an aura of the 
extraordinary about them. Supposedly they even surpassed the amazing exploits of the fictional super-spy 
character James Bond, whose creator Ian Fleming, himself a former officer of the Naval Intelligence 
Directorate, declared: 'James Bond is just a piece of nonsense I dreamed up. He's not a Sidney Reilly, you 
know!'(1) Other estimates of his achievements have been rather less flattering though. Some senior 
officials of the Foreign Office in London, for instance, were said to have dismissed the Reilly legend as 
one derived largely from his inclination to 'exaggerate his own importance', while an acclaimed historical 
study of Britain's secret intelligence agencies described Reilly's secret service career overall as 
'remarkable, though largely ineffective ...'.(2) Examination of his reports from South Russia, and their 
manner of compilation as well, affords us a unique opportunity to assess both his function and 
performance, at least on this particular occasion, as an agent in the field for MI6. It also offers another 
insight into the situation in the anti-Bolshevik camp in South Russia during the initial phase of Allied 
intervention in this region following upon the cessation of hostilities in the Great War of 1914-18. 
 
The only son of Pauline and Gregory Rosenblum, Sigmund Georgievich Rosenblum, alias Sidney George 
Reilly, was born on 24 March 1874 into a wealthy Polish-Jewish family with an estate at Bielsk in the 
Grodno Province of Imperial Russia.(3) His father was known locally as George rather than Gregory, 
hence Sigmund's patronymic Georgievich. The family seems to have been well connected in Polish 
national circles through Pauline's friendship with Ignac Paderewski, the famous Polish pianist and 
propagandist, who became Prime Minister of Poland in January 1919. Sigmund Rosenblum married a 
widow, Margaret Thomas, at the Holborn Registry Office in London on 22 August 1898 and, in the 
following year when he joined the British Secret Service, assumed the second name of her father, Edward 
Reilly Callahan, as his surname. Thus, Sidney Reilly the secret agent was born. 
 
Reilly came to notoriety as a British Secret Service agent (Agent Code ST1) in the summer of 1918, when 
his unsuccessful effort to have the Bolshevik Government in Moscow overthrown by the Latvian 
regiments on garrison duty in the city was exposed and publicised by the Bolshevik authorities. With the 
failure of this attempted coup, Reilly was forced into hiding and eventually managed to escape from 
Russia with the aid of one of his associates at the time, Captain George Alexander Hill, an agent of the 
Military Intelligence Directorate (Agent Code IK8). Making their separate ways back to England, Reilly 
and Hill arrived in London early in November 1918, within a few days of each other. After reporting 
independently to their respective superiors, Captain Mansfield Smith-Cumming RN, Chief of MI6, and 
Colonel J. H. Kisch, Deputy Director of Military Intelligence, both of them received decorations for their 
services in Russia - a Military Cross for Reilly and a Distinguished Service Order for Hill - and were sent 
on leave. Their leave was interrupted in mid-December by a summons to present themselves at Smith-
Cumming's office in London where, at his request, they volunteered to depart immediately on another 
Russian venture for MI6. The destination this time was to be South Russia. 
 
  
 
 
At the time, this region was home to a variety of anti-Bolshevik elements. Prominent among them were 
the thousands of officers, officer-cadets and Kuban Cossacks who together comprised the Volunteer 
Army commanded by General Anton Denikin. The Don Cossacks too, led by their Ataman, General Peter 
Krasnov, constituted a substantial part of this anti-Bolshevik movement. Krasnov and Denikin were bitter 
rivals for overall leadership of these forces in the quest for victory over the Bolsheviks and, ultimately, 
the restoration of a united Great Russia. This dispute would soon be settled though, with Krasnov's formal 
submission to Denikin as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia following their 
meeting at Torgovaya station on 8 January 1919. In addition to the Volunteers and Don Cossacks in the 
anti-Bolshevik camp, there were members of the Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets) active in 
politics in the Crimea and with Denikin, vociferous separatists among the Kuban Cossacks, forces of the 
Ukrainian Directorate led by Simon Petlyura operating in the vicinity of Odessa, and many others besides 
striving to have their voices heard and wishes realised in a climate of civil war in South Russia. This was 
the situation on which Reilly was to report to London. 
 
According to George Hill, Smith-Cumming's instructions were for them to gather information on the 
situation in South Russia, in order to assist British preparations for the Peace Conference opening in Paris 
on 18 January 1919. They would travel in the guise of British merchants, with appropriate credentials 
provided by the Department of Overseas Trade, After taking the afternoon train to Southampton, they 
crossed the English Channel overnight to Le Havre. During the crossing, they had the good fortune to 
share the cabin and hospitality of Paderewski, which gave Reilly an opportunity to reminisce with this old 
friend of the Rosenblum family. From Le Havre, they made their way by train through Paris to Marseilles 
and thence to Athens by British cruiser. A Greek destroyer under the command of a Royal Navy officer 
took them on to Sevastopol, in conditions that made for 'a terribly rough passage from Athens to the Black 
Sea', as Hill later recalled.(4) Upon their arrival in Sevastopol on 24 December, they parted company for 
the time being with John Picton Bagge, formerly British Consul-General at Odessa, who was returning 
there to resume his diplomatic duties. Reilly would later form a close association with Bagge when 
Odessa also became his base of operations early in February 1919. In the meantime, though, Reilly turned 
his attention in other directions. 
 
Over the next six weeks or so, Reilly prepared 12 despatches which were delivered personally by Hill to 
the Foreign Office in London on I March 1919.(5) These despatches reported on various aspects of the 
situation in South Russia and also provided some information on the state of affairs in Sovdepia, as 
Bolshevik Russia was then called by the Whites. Hill played a supportive role to Reilly in this regard and 
did not submit any despatches in his own right. Indeed, for a considerable part of their stay in 
Ekaterinodar, the Kuban capital, where Denikin had his headquarters, Hill was engaged in investigating 
'the state of Aviation in the Volunteer Army' on behalf of Major-General Frederick Poole, who was also 
in South Russia at this time on a special mission for the War Office.(6) So it was Reilly who had the 
leading role in this MI6 mission to South Russia. 
 
  
 
 
After four days in Sevastopol, Reilly had sufficient information to enable him in his first despatch to 
provide 'preliminary impressions' of the general state of affairs in South Russia. He acquired this 
information from conversations with Denikin's Minister of War, General Alexander Lukomsky, the 
Crimean Government's Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Marine, Maxim Vinaver and Admiral B. A. 
Kanin, as well as with officers of the Volunteer and Southern Armies 'and some of our former best 
informed Agents who were accidentally here'.(7) Reilly identified four principal factors in the affairs of 
South Russia at this time: the Volunteer Army; the territorial or provincial governments in the Kuban, 
Don and Crimea; the Petlyura movement in the Ukraine; and the economic situation. In his opinion, the 
future course of events in this region would depend not only on the interaction of these factors with each 
other, but 'above all upon Allied attitude towards them ...'. 
 
The Volunteer Army was identified by Reilly as the most outstanding of these factors, despite 
shortcomings which included a field strength of only 60 000 men and shortages of military material and 
clothing that were not only acute but detracted from the army's fighting quality and compelled the 
'retention of excessively large base forces amongst whom marked discontent and demoralisation' were 
apparent. Friction with the Kuban Government and the antipathy between Denikin and Krasnov over 
unity of command also added to the Volunteer Army's difficulties. Nevertheless, Reilly asserted that 
 
... Volunteer Army represents the only concrete dependable force and living symbol of Russian Unity. It 
has now passed its heroic period and reached critical point when [it] must either become determining 
factor for rallying all constructive elements or slowly but surely disintegrate. This will entirely depend 
upon promptitude and extent of Allied Support.(8) 
 
Allied support must be given immediately, he declared, and even initial 'moderate assistance in equipment 
and arament (sic) and declaration [of] moral support of Volunteer Army ... would produce most beneficial 
far-reaching results'. Although the urgency of the situation was the paramount issue for Reilly at this 
stage, he also signalled a need for the Allies to give more than just material and moral support to the 
Volunteer Army - a theme that would be developed later in this and other despatches. 
 
While his first despatch had little to say about the Cossack provincial governments in the Don and Kuban, 
it presented quite a favourable impression of the Kadet-dominated government in the Crimea led by 
Solomon Krym. This liberal provincial government was said to have an 'excellent' relationship with the 
Volunteer Army, which had agreed to 'support new government without interfering [in] civil 
administration'. Reilly considered this situation to be 'very instructive' and concluded that the 'Crimea 
could, with moderate Allied assistance, quickly become model of political and economic reconstruction 
for whole Russia'.(9) While he may have been fight in this general observation, his very positive 
perception of Crimean-Volunteer relations was anything but accurate, with the provincial government 
hoping for an Allied military commitment in the Crimea as an alternative to the Volunteers, whose 
behaviour often seemed to be more like that of a force of occupation than liberation.(10) On the other 
hand, the Volunteers in the Crimea resented what they perceived as the provincial government's weakness 
in dealing with subversion. The fact that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Crimean 
Government were Jews also would not have helped relations with the more intolerant, reactionary 
elements among the Volunteers. Nor did this liberal government enjoy anything like popular support, as 
suggested in Reilly's despatch. Kadets dominated the government, yet they had won only 7% of the vote 
from the Crimea in the Constituent Assembly elections of November 1917.(11) The only notable 
weaknesses of the Crimean Government mentioned by Reilly, however, were those said to be common to 
all provincial governments in South Russia, namely 'poor financial administration and excessive 
beurocratism (sic)'.(12) 
 
  
 
 
But his advocacy of this 'model' government was not sustained for long. Exactly a month later, after 
learning that Denikin proposed to transfer his headquarters from Ekaterinodar to Sevastopol in February 
1919, Reilly expressed his full support to 'the Volunteer Army abolishing the present Crimean 
Government and introducing an All Russian Government'. Rejecting arguments in favour of retaining 
Krym's administration in its limited, provincial role, he declared that 'in the regeneration of a United 
Russia such a government is not an element which should be preserved'. The Crimea had no claim to 
recognition 'as a separate territory' according to Reilly, and the presence there of a separate provincial 
government in addition to Denikin's proposed All-Russian Government would provide 'an unnecessary 
third factor' that could hamper the activities of the 'two real forces - the Allies and the Volunteer Army 
...'.(13) So Reilly's original acceptance of the local Kadet perception of the Crimean Government gave 
way to a different view, emanating from Volunteer Army headquarters, which saw disruptive and even 
separatist tendencies in all such manifestations of political independence.(14) On this issue at least, it 
would seem that he had become an advocate rather than an analyst of the Volunteer Army's position. 
Deterioration of the military situation later combined with the opposition of General Louis Franchet 
d'Esperey, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in the Near East, to change Denikin's mind about 
moving to the Crimea, much to the relief of Krym and his colleagues, who continued to govern as 
before.(15) Although Reilly kept silent about this turn of events, he would hardly have shared the 
Crimean Government's sense of relief at the outcome. 
 
The major concern in the Crimea from Reilly's point of view was the small numerical strength of the 
Volunteer contingent, which he estimated at 'about 2000 men'. According to his assessment, mobilisation 
in the Crimea had hardly been an effective means of augmenting the small force sent there originally by 
Denikin, mainly because of the 'exceedingly low pay' offered by the Volunteers. Until this situation was 
remedied, Reilly maintained that the numerically strong Bolshevik element in the Crimea 'can only be 
contained by presence [of] Allied forces'.(16) Allied forces actually were present in Sevastopol at the 
time, with troops of the French 176th Regiment commanded by Colonel Ruillier arriving on 26 December 
1918 to replace 500 Royal Marines who had been landed there earlier, on 1 December. But these troops 
were never in any position to play the decisive anti-Bolshevik role advocated for them by Reilly. Indeed, 
in the ultimate testament to the frailty of their position, the French Command in Sevastopol entered into 
negotiations with the Bolsheviks in April 1919, to allow for the evacuation by 30 April of all French 
forces in the city without interference from the Red Army.(17) Solomon Krym's liberal government also 
evacuated the Crimea at this time, leaving Sevastopol for Constantinople on 15 April aboard a Russian 
ship rather ironically called Hope.(18) Thus, the Crimean situation was to be instructive as Reilly had 
said, but obviously not in the way that he had envisaged. 
 
  
 
 
Petlyura and his associates in the Ukrainian Directorate 'are not Bolchevike', reported Reilly, 'but their 
tatics (sic) fatally lead to Bolchevism'. They led a Ukrainian national movement committed to deposing 
Hetman Paul Skoropadsky - his unpopular regime had been set up earlier in 1918 by the German forces of 
occupation - and establishing peasant control over the land and worker control over industry. This 
socialist, separatist movement had been organised and financed by the 'very powerful Dniepro-Soius, the 
Union of the Ukrainian Co-operative Societies'. Claims of support for Petlyura from the Central Powers 
were dismissed out of hand by Reilly with the assertion: 'Nothing substantiates widespread opinion that 
Petlura (sic) financed by Germany or Austria.' According to Reilly's assessment, Petlyura was caught 'in a 
vicious circle': 
 
either he will be squashed by Allied intervention and then he must invoke Bolchevik help or he will be 
swamped and ousted by Bolchevism whose motto he adopted from tactical considerations.(19) 
 
Reilly advocated Allied assistance to organise South Russia into a suitable '"place d'armes" for decisive 
advance against Petlurism and Bolchevism'. In his opinion: 
 
The military Allied assistance required for this would be comparatively small as proved by recent events 
in Odessa. Landing parties in the ports and detachments assisting Volunteer Army on lines of 
communication would probably be sufficient.(20) 
 
Reilly's reference to events in Odessa concerned the successful landing there on 18 December 1918 of 
troops from the French 156th Division commanded by General Borius, who managed to wrest control of 
the city from the Petlyurists with the assistance of a small contingent of Volunteers. But this initial 
instance of Franco-Volunteer cooperation was not to spark the kind of partnership hoped for by Reilly. On 
the contrary, the attitude of the French Command in Odessa soon became hardened towards the 
Volunteers in favour of cooperation with Petlyura.(21) Consequently, Petlyura escaped the vicious circle 
of destruction envisaged for him by Reilly and continued throughout 1919 to be a source of some 
frustration to Denikin in the Ukraine. 
 
Urgent as the need for Allied military assistance to the Volunteer Army was in Reilly's estimation, he 
regarded economic assistance for South Russia as 'even more pressing ...'. Manufactured goods were so 
scarce in this region that he considered any moderate contribution from the Allies would have a most 
beneficial effect: 
 
Even few cargoes would greatly alleviate situation, lead to influx of foodstuffs, consolidate military 
power and moral influence of ... Volunteer Army and constitute most effective propoganda (sic) for Allies 
and against Bolchevism.(22) 
 
The 'element of time' was critical in this regard and Reilly urged that the Allied Governments give this 
matter their 'most urgent consideration ...'. Otherwise, apart from echoing General Poole's suggestion for a 
British or Anglo-French Commission to control merchant shipping engaged in trading activities in the 
Black Sea, Reilly did not offer any solutions to what he called a state of 'general economic chaos' in South 
Russia.(23) Instead, as a means of clearly assessing the entire region's actual economic situation and 
needs, he suggested a convention in Simferopol of representatives of the provincial governments, the 
Volunteer Army and the Allies. The ultimate task of these representatives would be to elect a Russian 
delegation to proceed to Europe, in a joint quest for economic assistance relative to the needs identified at 
the Simferopol conference. Contrary to Reilly's expectation, however, there would never be the necessary 
state of unity in the anti-Bolshevik camp for realisation of an initiative of this kind, in Simferopol or 
anywhere else. 
 
  
 
 
With these preliminary impressions in mind, Reilly left Sevastopol with Hill on 28 December for 
Ekaterinodar, where they arrived on 31 December. After eight days in the Kuban capital, during which he 
spoke to 'practically everybody of any prominence officially, politically or commercially' - except 
Denikin, who was otherwise engaged at the front - Reilly considered himself to be 'in a position to give an 
approximately correct resume of the situation here'. His first concern was still the Volunteer Army, which 
he regarded as 'the pivot of the entire situation...'. Indeed, he went so far as to assert 'that today the 
Volunteer Army is universally looked upon as the military and political cement which alone can bind 
together the disrupted parts of Russia into one whole state-organism'. Neither the Bolsheviks nor Ataman 
Krasnov would have agreed with this assertion because, like the Volunteer Army Commander, General 
Denikin, they also had ambitions incorporating a Great Russian vision. But their ambitions were 
anathema to the Allies - hence Reilly's perception of Denikin as the one person who, as Dictator of the 
White movement, could bring about the restoration of Great Russia. The White leader in East Russia, 
Admiral Alexander Kolchak, was seen as having a cooperative role to play with Denikin and the Allies in 
this regard. But any prior claim on Kolchak's part to 'an All-Russian dictatorship' was not admitted since, 
in Reilly's opinion, to 'pacify Siberia and to enter Moscow from the East is far from being synonymous 
with a re-conquest of Russia'. On the other hand, the task before Denikin was said to be not only 'far more 
difficult but also more comprehensive and, if successfully accomplished, its results will be more far-
reaching'. Settlement of this question would clear the way for Denikin to issue a definite and detailed 
'declaration of policy' - an 'urgent necessity' according to Reilly, because the monarchist image of many 
Volunteers 'gives rise to a considerable amount of suspicion amongst a great part of the population and is 
hampering the increase of the Volunteer Army'.(24) 
 
The ongoing dispute with Krasnov over unity of command in South Russia was another matter mentioned 
by Reilly as having prevented the declaration of a detailed political programme on Denikin's part. A 
solution to this contentious issue was said to be 'imminent', however, 'thanks to the efforts of General 
Poole', with considerable benefits ensuing to the Volunteer Army: 
 
The solution of the question of Supreme Command will immediately give the Volunteer Army military 
sway over practically the whole South East of Russia and the Black Sea Littoral, it will immensely raise 
its prestige, it will enable it to increase its fighting force to a very large extent and it will vastly improve 
its material position.(25) 
 
Reilly's obvious satisfaction with developments in Volunteer-Don Cossack relations was tempered 
somewhat by his anxiety over the political situation in the Kuban, where he reported 'party strife is in full 
blast ...'. The recent election for the office of Kuban Ataman had seen the incumbent, General A. P. 
Filimonov, a Line Cossack, narrowly defeat his Black Sea Cossack rival, L. L. Bych, who had resigned as 
Prime Minister to contest this election. Following his re-election as Ataman, Filimonov had appointed 
another Line Cossack, F. S. Sushkov, as Prime Minister rather than reinstating Bych to this position. 
Reilly accused Black Sea Cossack leaders like Bych and N. S. Ryabovol, 'former President of the Kuban 
Rada', of 'satisfying their personal ambitions' in pursuing the policy of separatism originally fostered in 
South Russia by the Central Powers. 'These men are now adherents of Petlura (sic)', he declared, 'and are 
naturally opposed to the "United Russia" idea and the Volunteer Army'. In contrast, Filimonov was 
described as 'well meaning but rather weak' and, consequently, Reilly was 'not at all certain whether the 
new Government will be able to maintain itself'. He summed up the situation as follows: 
 
  
 
 
The prevailing atmosphere is not a healthy one, neither for the political stability of the Kuban territory nor 
for the Volunteer Army which is still greatly dependent upon the territory's resources and upon its support 
in men - but a firm Allied policy coupled with some pressure with regards to imports would be the best 
safeguard of civil peace.(26) 
 
This analysis of the state of affairs in the Kuban early in January 1919 provided some background to 
Reilly's later observation that the 'ultimate fate of the Volunteer Army depends as much upon its political 
as upon its military success'.(27) He urged the Allies to make their own contribution to success in both of 
these areas by establishing 'permanent Allied representation with the Volunteer Army ...'. From a British 
perspective, he was quite precise on the form this representation should take: 
 
The usefulness of a High Commissioner with wide powers and, if possible independent from the High 
Commissioner in the Black Sea, assisted by a Staff of experts on military, political and economic affairs, 
would be very considerable.(28) 
 
This proposal for a British High Commission in South Russia later received some support at the Foreign 
Office from Reilly's friend in the Political Intelligence Department, Rex Leeper, as well as from an 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Sir Ronald Graham.(29) But, as with similar suggestions from 
General Poole and his predecessor in South Russia, Lieutenant-Colonel Albemarle Blackwood, the 
Foreign Secretary, whose opinion mattered most, was unmoved.(30) 
 
On the military side, Reilly reported: 
 
The military situation of the Volunteer Army is extremely serious, the question of its equipments, 
provisioning, armaments and of its technical means cannot be characterised otherwise than appalling, (I 
am borrowing this definition from a conversation on this subject with General Poole); the question of the 
urgency of Allied assistance becomes therefore more important than the question of its extent.(31) 
 
Reilly gave considerable emphasis to this urgency factor, which had been raised initially in his first 
despatch, contending that 'the element of time is so essential, so all-important, that it cannot be too 
strongly insisted upon'. If it was ignored, he warned, 'the Volunteer Army will most certainly share the 
fate which befell the Czekho-Slovak regiments in Eastern Russia in the autumn of 1918'. With respect to 
material assistance, the Allies were urged to be as generous as possible, because this 'will prove in the end 
to be also the greatest economy'. Clothing was required from the Allies as well as arms, to allow Denikin's 
forces to carry on the fight against the Bolsheviks. 'Whippet tanks and bombing aeroplanes' were 
mentioned as special requirements that 'would prove most effective' in South Russia.(32) 
 
Direct intervention by Allied military forces also was advocated again by Reilly. When he and George 
Hill interviewed General Denikin on 10 January, they found the newly proclaimed Commander-in-Chief 
of the Armed Forces of South Russia to have very definite views on this particular subject. Reilly's report 
of this interview with Denikin quoted verbatim 'the most pregnant of his remarks': 
 
  
 
 
People think that in order to pacify Russia, all one has to do is to take Moscow, To hear again the sound 
of the Kremlin bells would, of course, be very pleasant, but we cannot save Russia through Moscow. 
Russia must be re-conquered as a whole, and to do this we have to carry out a very wide sweeping 
movement from the South, moving right across Russia. We cannot do this alone. We must have the 
assistance of the Allies. Equipment and armament alone are not sufficient; We must have Allied troops 
which will move behind us, holding the territories which we will reconquer, by garrisoning the towns, 
policing the country and protecting our lines of communications. Only then shall we be able to mobilise 
fresh troops in the territories occupied, introduce the most necessary guarantees of order and move 
forward without anxiety. Simultaneously we must have assistance in organising the transport and we must 
have the necessary manufactured goods of which the country is completely bare. We will do all the 
fighting, but you must stand by and protect us from being struck in the back.(33) 
 
In conversation with Reilly and Hill on 11 January, Denikin's Assistant, General Abram Dragomirov, 
estimated on the question of direct military intervention 'that 15 Allied divisions will be necessary'.(34) 
While the 'prevailing opinion' in South Russia considered that 'intervention can be confined to the 
garrisoning of reconquered towns and the protection of important lines of communication' as proposed by 
Denikin, Reilly himself supported the 'minority of opinion' which, he noted: 
 
favours a moderate support on the fighting line, relying, and I think justly so, upon the stiffening effect 
Allied troops would have upon the Volunteer Army and upon the moral impression they would produce in 
the Bolchevik Camp. To lay down as a principle "that not a single Allied soldier's life should be sacrificed 
in Russia" may prove, to use a homely simile, to be penny-wise and pound-foolish.(35) 
 
What he did not know, of course, was that the Imperial War Cabinet had already decided against sending 
British troops to South Russia to assist Denikin's forces. Nor could he foresee at this stage that the 
military intervention which the French had begun on a modest scale in the Ukraine would soon begin to 
develop in a manner hardly supportive of the Volunteers.(36) Later, when he based himself in Odessa and 
was able to observe the situation at close hand, Reilly would have much to report and criticise about the 
direction of French intervention in the Ukraine. 
 
Under the guidance of the Bolshevik War Commissar, Leon Trotsky, whose 'prestige as a military 
organizer', Reilly admitted, 'is very high', the numerical strength of the Red Army was estimated to have 
increased appreciably 'to 400 to 500 000 men ...'.(37) They were described as well-disciplined troops led 
in the field by trained officers, many of whom had been regular officers of the old regime. The Reds' main 
military effort was said to be directed against Denikin in South Russia, 'whom it is desirable to crush as 
rapidly as possible in order to throw immediately afterwards the whole weight against the Siberian and 
Archangel forces'. Reilly estimated that the Red Army would be quite a formidable force by the spring of 
1919, with more than 1 000 000 men in the field. Nevertheless, he agreed with local opinion in 
Ekaterinodar which considered 'the military problem of overcoming the Bolcheviks' to be 'a 
comparatively easy one'. 'The Bolchevik armies will not stand up to regular troops', he claimed, 
'especially if the latter are technically well equipped'. Once again, the need for 'quick decisive action' was 
expressed, with Reilly insisting: 'It will be fatal for Russia and probably for Europe if this task is not 
accomplished by next summer'.(38) This last comment was somewhat prophetic for, in the absence of 
direct military intervention by the Allies to assist him, Denikin would actually find the military problem 
of overcoming the Bolsheviks anything but easy to address and, ultimately, impossible for him to solve. 
 
  
 
 
In the equally important political struggle with the Bolsheviks, Denikin was reported to have support from 
the 'strictly non-socialist' National Centre, a Kadet-dominated body which 'now occupies the leading place 
in Russian constructive politics, and ... has much to do with the shaping of the All-Russian policy of the 
Volunteer Army'.(39) Moderate political figures from this organisation like the Kadets Michael Fedorov, 
President of the National Centre, and Nicholas Astrov, former Mayor of Moscow, had been drawn to the 
Volunteer Army, Reilly explained, because they 'saw in a United Russia the only cornerstone of every 
practical political program'.(40) Fedorov and Astrov were even members without portfolio of Denikin's 
Special Council. The National Centre itself proposed a Dictatorship of the White movement in the person 
of Denikin, declaring that he and his Special Council 
 
must aim at the pacification of the country and at reforms, guaranteeing the creation of a future Great 
Russia, whose final form of Government will be determined by a National Assembly, which is to be 
called in calmer circumstances after the victory over the Bolcheviks.(41) 
 
'Although in the main lines the political tendencies of the C.i.C. and his Council are identical with those 
of the National Centre', Reilly observed, 'still monarchist aspirations are strong in some political coteries 
close to the C.i.C....'.(42) So, with this apparently slight qualification in relation to the influence of 
monarchist circles at Volunteer Army headquarters, the political positions of General Denikin, his Special 
Council and the National Centre were purported to be one and the same. Yet Reilly later identified 'the 
two Chief Military Advisers of General Denikin', Generals Lukomsky and Dragomirov, as 'convinced 
Monarchists' who exercised considerable influence over the Commander-in-Chief in political matters.(43) 
Indeed, Denikin's delay in issuing a political declaration was attributed by Reilly largely to their influence 
in opposing any specific statement of political goals for the White movement, on the grounds that it 
would be deeply resented by the strong representation of monarchist officers in the Volunteer Army. As 
Dragomirov and Lukomsky also held the Special Council portfolios of President and War Minister 
respectively, these two officers were well placed to dominate the one formally instituted avenue of advice 
to Denikin on political and administrative affairs - and certainly did so.(44) In practical administrative 
terms, Reilly himself indicated that the dominance of such arch-conservative generals in the political 
arena led to 'the present state of things when military men, who have a very scant acquaintance with civil 
administration, often commit grave administrative errors which provoke the dissatisfaction of a large part 
of the population and are detrimental to the prestige of the Volunteer Army'.(45) Later, he also reported 
with regret 'that many complaints have reached me as to very improper practices on the part of 
subordinate military and civil officials of the Volunteer Army'. 'Such practices naturally throw an odium 
on the whole Volunteer Army', he concluded.(46) Thus, while Denikin may have been a liberal at heart 
who enjoyed the support of the National Centre as Reilly claimed, his regime gave every indication of 
fostering a reactionary rather than a reformist political position. Clearly, despite Reilly's effort to distort 
the fact, a dramatic change in circumstances would be necessary for the reformist ambitions of the 
National Centre really to have any hope of fulfilment via the Special Council or Commander-in-Chief of 
the Armed Forces of South Russia. 
 
  
 
 
Economic and financial conditions in South Russia had reached a point beyond which the Whites could 
cope with the situation according to Reilly, even though civilian officials rather than generals had been 
appointed to the relevant Special Council portfolios in these areas. Allied assistance was prescribed as an 
essential ingredient to remedy this state of affairs. 'The two leading factors in the economical situation of 
Southern and South Eastern Russia', Reilly reported, 'are the lack of manufactured goods and the complete 
disorganisation of transport - both by land and by sea ...'. In an effort to address these particular factors, 
the Whites proposed establishing control boards 'to assume complete control over the entire tonnage, the 
import, distribution and transport of goods from abroad and the export of goods from Russia'. It was 
envisaged that such control boards would be 'composed of representatives of the Volunteer Army the 
various territories and of the Allied Governments'.(47) Apparently Allied involvement in these White 
control boards was intended as a basis for broad participation by the Allies in the general process of 
economic recovery in Russia. The Foreign Office later referred this proposal for consideration by the 
Department of Overseas Trade, but nothing ever came of it.(48) Without Allied backing, the Special 
Council would find itself unable to muster the necessary support in South Russia to assume anything like 
effective overall control, through boards or otherwise, of economic developments in this region.(49) 
 
Reilly found White officials 'helpless' in coming to terms with 'the colossal disaster which has overtaken 
Russia's finances, ... and unable to frame anything, approaching even an outline, of a financial policy'. But 
he supported their request for the Allies to print '500 Million roubles of Nicholas money of all 
denominations' for the Special Council as a matter of urgency, with the justification that 'although one 
realizes the fundamental futility of this remedy, one must agree with them that for the moment this is the 
only remedy'.(50) Unlike General Poole, however, who had requested the printing of special rouble notes 
similar to those provided by the British in North Russia, Reilly recommended Imperial rubles because 
they were most in demand of all the currencies then in circulation and readily accepted by the peasantry in 
exchange for foodstuffs. His discussions with I. A. Geiman, ex-Finance Minister on the Special Council, 
and the incumbent, M. V. Bernardsky, a recent arrival from Kiev, revealed their hope that, in the longer 
term, a central banking system could be established in Russia to control the issue of currency and, with 
international support, 'to bring back the Rouble within a reasonable time to the gold value'. Reilly did not 
consider himself sufficiently qualified to appraise these 'very technical and complicated' matters, so he 
simply suggested 'that M. Bernadsky's presence at an Inter-Allied Conference on Russian Finance would 
assist much to elucidate these very complicated problems'.(51) There would be no such conference, 
however, nor would printed notes be supplied, for the Whites were to be left by the Allies to fend 
financially for themselves. 
 
  
 
 
Lack of funds was one reason offered by Reilly to explain the Whites' blatant inactivity in the propaganda 
field. They were also said to be lacking paper and printing presses needed for the preparation of 
propaganda material. Reilly claimed that the Special Council had come to appreciate fully the benefits of 
propaganda and, consequently, was in the process of having General Dragomirov organise a Department 
of Propaganda. 'It will be an immense undertaking to fight in this particular field the Bolcheviks', Reilly 
declared, 'who are really the greatest masters of propaganda the world has ever seen and who dispose for 
this purpose of unlimited means'. But he was adamant that 'this task must be performed and it will 
probably be in the proper interests of the Allied Governments to extend generous cooperation'. As well as 
the Allies providing the necessary money and material, Reilly proposed assisting the Volunteer Army 'by 
disseminating information about it and about the present state of Russia in Allied Countries'. This was a 
rather specialised task in his opinion, requiring the persons involved to have certain specific qualities: 
 
Undoubtedly good work in this direction can be done by British newspaper correspondents, but I would 
suggest that correspondents are as a rule too professional to get a grip on public imagination, and that men 
of high imaginative powers and possessed of intuitional insight into Russian affairs of the stamp of 
Maurice Baring or R. C. Long would probably be far more useful.(52) 
 
Reilly's preference for propagandists with the imaginative powers of fiction writers makes an interesting 
contrast with General Poole's inclination towards good journalists, like Harold Williams and Julius West. 
The Foreign Office response in each case was to advocate to the War Office the employment of Edmund 
Candler, a well-known war correspondent with the British Expeditionary Force in Mesopotamia, whom 
the Foreign Secretary considered to be 'in every way suitable' for this propagandist role.(53) Reilly 
himself actually prevailed upon a Russian journalist, Boris Suvorin, 'former editor of "Novoie Vremia" 
and a man of exceptional literary talent ..., to write a small book on the Volunteer Army which ought to be 
very useful when translated into English and French'.(54) He also promised to acquire from Basil Shulgin 
in Odessa for transmission to London, a collection of 'very interesting material on the Bolchevik activities 
and atrocities ...'. 'What ever the diversity of opinion may be about extending military and economical 
help to Russia', Reilly concluded, 'there can be only one opinion on the urgent necessity of world-wide 
propaganda against Bolchevism as the greatest danger that has ever threatened civilisation'.(55) 
 
With the Torgovaya agreement between Denikin and Krasnov proclaimed by both parties on 8 January 
1919 and General Poole's first 'official' visit to the Don underway from 11 January, Reilly also took the 
opportunity to journey there with George Hill so they could see the situation in Krasnov's realm for 
themselves. Accordingly, they embarked on a five-day trip from 12 January, visiting Rostov and 
Novocherkassk before returning to Ekaterinodar on 17 January. In the course of this visit to the Don, 
Reilly was 'in continuous contact with men occupying the most diverse official and social positions and 
representing the leading currents of political opinion'.(56) His report on the state of affairs on the Don is 
easily the most interesting and incisive of the despatches from South Russia. 
 
  
 
 
As Reilly explained in the covering note to this report, his analysis concentrated on political factors 
because, on the Don, 'the political situation puts everything else into the background ...'. His enquiries 
revealed a political situation which he described as 'complicated in the extreme; the outward aspect of 
things is very deceiving and one has to dive very deep under the surface in order to get at anything 
approaching the truth'. An 'undeniable fact' of Don politics, however, was Krasnov's position as 'the pivot 
of the entire situation'. 'No matter to whom or on what subject one spoke', Reilly discovered, 'one finally 
landed in a discussion of Krasnoff, his regime and the dangers which they represent for the immediate 
future of the Don'. Reilly was surprised that nothing in Krasnov's past seemed to explain his sudden rise 
to a position of such prominence and power. Nevertheless, Reilly admitted that Krasnov 'proved himself a 
very capable military organiser and a still greater practical statesman' following his election as Don 
Ataman in May 1918, although his achievement in clearing the Reds from most of the Don was attributed 
'partly to the dash and ability of his commanders ... but mostly to the assistance in armament obtained 
from the Germans ...'. The Germans were also said to have played a decisive role in his re-election as Don 
Ataman on 15 August 1918, by making it clear beforehand 'that no further armament could be supplied 
unless Krasnoff was elected Ataman'. This explicit linking of Krasnov's re-election to the continuance of 
German material aid to the Don Cossack forces resulted in the withdrawal from the election of General 
Bogaevsky, whom Reilly described as a more popular candidate than Krasnov and one well-known for his 
sympathies towards the Allies and the Volunteer Army. Krasnov's past association with the Germans was 
an issue which Reilly sought to expose in his report, rather than explain or excuse. In his view, whatever 
the circumstances of Krasnov's position, 'it must never be forgotten that he had the Germans to back him 
up ...'.(57) 
 
Krasnov's government was denounced as one 'for which the old regime in some of its worst forms 
supplied the inspiration and the methods'. Given the 'rather indifferent calibre' of most members of the 
Don Legislative Council and the complete devotion to Krasnov of all but one of the Council of Ministers - 
General Bogaevsky, as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, was the exception - Reilly considered this 
government to be 'a purely personal one ... in the hands of the "Camarilla" which surrounds the Ataman'. 
The leading members of this Camarilla were known to include the Don Army Commander and War 
Minister, General S. V. Denisov, his Chief-of-Staff, General I. A. Polyakov, Krasnov's personal roving 
envoy, General N. A. Svechin, as well as Colonel G. P. Yanov, who had been instrumental in persuading 
Krasnov to stand for election as Don Ataman in May 1918. Reilly depicted a regime of quite deplorable 
characteristics as having developed on the Don under the Camarilla's direction and Krasnov's authority: 
 
  
 
 
The chief administrative posts are filled by men professing extreme Monarchist and reactionary views and 
applying in the practical execution of their office the methods of the 'Black Hundreds'.... Bribery and 
abuses of power abound everywhere. The lawcourts which contain some of the worst of the old regime 
judges have entirely lost the confidence of the people. The police in the towns and the militia in the 
'Stannitzas' (the Cossak [sic] villages) are a law unto themselves.(58) 
 
'Under the guise of fighting socialism', Reilly declared, 'a number of glaring administrative crimes have 
been committed'. He cited as one example the case of Rebecca Albam, a university student from Rostov, 
who was acquitted by court martial of the charge of fostering sedition, only to be murdered while under 
militia escort to a place of banishment beyond the borders of the Don. As he recalled the circumstances, 
'the next day her corpse with her head smashed in by rifle butts has (sic) been discovered in a field a 
couple of miles from Kantemirovka which is still in Don territory'. Another incident reported by Reilly as 
the cause of a great scandal on the Don was 'the suppression and confiscation of all stores of an 
organisation of former "Zemstvo" and Red Cross men who were attempting to fight rationally the terrible 
increase of spotted typhus ...'. He concluded that 'the regime of Krasnoff and his Camarilla is an excellent 
illustration of Tallyrand's phrase about the Bourbons: 'Ils n'ont rien appris ni rien oublie [They have 
neither learnt nor forgotten anything]'. Consequently, he expressed 'grave apprehension' at this state of 
affairs on the Don which was, in his opinion, 'not withstanding its outward appearance of security, a very 
unstable and possibly dangerous one'.(59) 
 
All sections of society on the Don were reported to be outraged at the Krasnov regime's reactionary 
character and widespread abuse of its power. In the towns, the workers were being 'driven into the arms of 
the Bolsheviks by the suppression of every kind of labour association', while the resentment in the 
Cossack stanitsy at the lawlessness of the militia was finding 'its echo amongst the soldiers at the front'. 
Another 'disquieting element' for Reilly was the regime's 'deliberate fostering of the historical antagonism 
between the Cossaks and the Inogorodnie (the Uitlanders)'. This was being done, he claimed, because 'the 
powers that be ... fear the influence of the politically far more advanced Uitlanders in the "Great Kroug" 
...'. These rising tensions in Don society were sufficient cause for Reilly to fear a probable recurrence of 
the 'outbreak of Bolshevism on the Don' which had brought about the demise of Ataman Kaledin in 
February 1918. So while the Don was under attack from outside by the Red Army, internally, the 
disagreeable nature of Krasnov's regime aroused active sympathy towards Bolshevism among the workers 
and Inogorodnye, and an attitude of passivity in many Cossacks. 'The population of the Don is being 
forged between the hammer of Krasnoff's regime and the anvil of Bolshevism', Reilly declared, 'and its 
temper will be accordingly'.(60) 
 
  
 
 
This state of affairs certainly did not help Reilly's confidence in the Don Army's capacity to sustain 
effective resistance to the mounting pressure being applied externally by the vastly superior Red forces. 
Although he accepted 'that Krasnoff has performed a truly Herculean task in organising, training, and 
equipping an army of about 60 000 men, which ... has so far done efficient service', Reilly questioned 'the 
intrinsic stability of this army'. The situation at the front rated as 'not particularly sound' in his estimation, 
given the recent loss of considerable ground to the Reds on the Northern Front in Voronezh, as well as the 
dangerously exposed position of the Cossack forces on the Western Front in the Donets region following 
the withdrawal from this area of German and Austrian troops in the Ukraine. Concern was expressed too 
over several recent cases of entire regiments of Cossacks 'leaving the front for their stannitzas'. The state 
of affairs behind the lines was hardly better. 'Much ado has been made over the splendid appearance and 
discipline of the two Cossak regiments stationed in Rostoff and Taganrog', Reilly noted, 'but it must not 
be forgotten that they are Guard Regiments, that they are being pampered and that they have not been to 
the front'. He pointed to the officers' reactionary character as a sign of instability of these regiments and 
recalled that, during his stay in Rostov, 'two officers of the Cossak Guard regiment were deliberately 
murdered in revenge for their ill treatment of privates and there was reliable information that soldier 
committees are secretly being formed'. Altogether, the military situation looked ominous to Reilly, who 
reported that, should the Reds strike a strong blow against the Don, then in the opinion of 'most 
trustworthy judges ..., the army will disintegrate ...'.(61) 
 
Reilly was especially interested in Krasnov's attitude towards the Volunteer Army now that the 
Torgovaya agreement had been proclaimed. Among those with whom Reilly discussed this matter, he 
detected 'the general feeling ...that this agreement has not been entered into by Krasnoff in a "bona fide" 
spirit and that as long as he can, he will avoid to carry it into effect or at least he will hamper its execution 
in every possible way'. Krasnov himself compelled Reilly to share this general view when he 'flared up' 
during an interview with the British agent and alleged 'in a rather aggressive way', that the supreme 
command resulting from the Torgovaya agreement was 'premature' and indicative of the Volunteer Army 
Command 'thinking only of grasping the maximum amount of power ...'. Also, the formation of Denikin's 
government was 'still in the experimental stages', Krasnov told Reilly, whereas 'on the Don, the 
Government is mature', with 'a fully organised apparatus to take charge not only of the military but also of 
the economical tasks'. This outburst convinced Reilly that Krasnov could not be trusted to respect 
Denikin's authority. In Reilly's opinion, only Allied pressure energetically applied could change the 
situation, by persuading Krasnov 'that above all we look to him to carry out the agreement with Denikin 
not only in the letter but also in the spirit'.(62) 
 
  
 
 
Another matter of special interest to Reilly was the prevailing attitude of anti-Bolsheviks on the Don 
generally towards the Allies. He found 'opinion was unanimous' in expecting 'equipment, armament and 
economic help' from the Allies for all elements of the White movement in South Russia, as well as 'troops 
to assist holding the re-conquered territories and to protect the lines of communication'. He also detected 
'general disappointment' that so little had been done thus far by the Allies towards meeting these 
expectations. 'The Russians have become used to the rapidity and decision of the Germans', Reilly 
reported, 'and they cannot understand our deliberate methods which are interpreted as weakness'. Indeed, 
he noticed the creation of an impression in some quarters 'that we are afraid of our Bolsheviks and that we 
do not intend to intervene seriously in Russia'. Those Allied missions already seen on the Don - the 
military missions of General Poole and Captain Fouquet and the earlier naval mission led by Commander 
Bond - really had not helped to raise the image of the Allies locally, according to Reilly. The intelligentsia 
in particular 'looked with great disfavour at Allied officers unreservedly accepting the lavish hospitality of 
Krasnoff', and perceived such behaviour as a 'sign of Allied approval of Krasnoff's regime'. 'The 
unfortunate fact that at every visit of Allied officers, the old National Hymn "God protect the Czar" has 
been repeatedly and insistently played at the slightest pretext', Reilly continued, 'has produced deplorable 
impression and is being interpreted as a proof that the Allies have come to restore the Monarchy'. It was 
appreciated by the 'discontented elements', however, who exploited 'such "faux pas"' to the extent 'that a 
legend has found credence that the Allied officers who came to the Don, were Russian Monarchists 
dressed up in French and British Uniforms'.(63) Although Reilly seemed more amused than anxious at 
this development, Krasnov showed greater concern a few days later by personally denouncing the veracity 
of the 'legend' in an order to the Don Army proclaimed on 23 January 1919. This order named the Allied 
officers who had visited the Don with General Poole, identified those still resident in Ekaterinodar and, in 
respect of the latter, issued this challenge to anyone still unconvinced by Krasnov's proclamation: 'Go to 
Ekaterinodar ... ask them. Look at them. Are they in disguise, or are they genuine?'(64) For Krasnov to be 
really convincing, however, some tangible evidence of Allied support to the Don was an urgent 
imperative. But, in the absence of any definite sign of such support, neither Krasnov nor his anti-
Bolshevik opponents on the Don, whom Reilly perceived as 'very discouraged at our delicate treatment of 
Krasnoff', had cause to regard the Allies favourably. 
 
In concluding his report on the Don, Reilly submitted that the fate of Ataman Krasnov was in the Allies' 
hands. 'The maintaining of Krasnoff in office', he declared, 'is not a "conditio sine qua non" of the Don's 
political stability'. But, given his display of 'considerable organising ability and firmness under extremely 
difficult circumstances', Reilly considered it 'preferable if a chastened Krasnoff could remain at the head 
of affairs'. Nevertheless, General Bogaevsky offered an alternative 'acceptable to an overwhelming 
majority of the population' and, according to Reilly, Bogaevsky would actually challenge Krasnov for the 
office of Don Ataman at the forthcoming Assembly of the Grand Don Krug opening on 14 February 
1919. Krasnov was said to have 'already started a very strong campaign in his own favour' and from a 
position strengthened by the impression of support for his regime given by 'the recent visits of the Allied 
Missions ...'. Reilly was still confident, however, that in respect of the challenge posed by Bogaevsky, 'it 
will be in our hands whether he shall replace Krasnoff'.(65) But the Allies followed Denikin's example in 
this matter and chose to leave Krasnov's fate to the Assembly of the Grand Don Krug. The Assembly 
accepted the resignation of Ataman Krasnov on 14 February, after having demanded the resignations of 
his subordinates, Generals Denisov and Polyakov, as those deemed to be chiefly responsible for a military 
situation verging on catastrophic at that time, with 'the Don Cossack Army, continually retreating, and 
melted down to fifteen thousand', according to Denikin's recollection.(66) Then, on 19 February, the 
Assembly elected Bogaevsky to the office of Don Ataman with 239 votes, against 52 votes for 
Krasnov.(67) Although Reilly had not predicted this particular outcome, his forecasts for the Don were 
largely borne out in the events leading to the Assembly's adverse judgement of the superficially sound yet 
intrinsically unstable nature of Krasnov's regime. 
 
  
 
 
Having concluded his investigations on the Don and Kuban, Reilly left Ekaterinodar at much the same 
time as General Poole - 24 January 1919 - rejoining Hill in Novorossiisk and then proceeding by ship to 
Sevastopol en route to Odessa. It is likely, therefore, that the two British Secret Service agents travelled 
together with Poole on the sea journey from Novorossiisk to Sevastopol, after which they and the general 
finally parted company. Whilst in Sevastopol, where he and Hill were obliged to spend several days 
awaiting a ship to Odessa, Reilly observed the impact of Bolshevik propaganda on the Allied service 
personnel there. 'It is interesting to note that the Bolchevik agitators could make no headway at all with 
the British sailors', he reported, whereas among the French troops the propaganda effort 'to create a 
feeling of homesickness ... is beginning to have some effect'.(68) He also reported receiving by courier 
from Moscow - no other details of this source are provided - news which indicated the prevalence of 
desperate conditions in Sovdepia: 
 
The food situation is terrible ... Spotted typhus and other infectious diseases are ravaging the towns and 
villages ... There is practically no fuel ... All private trade has stopped and 9/10 of the shops are closed ... 
The industrial life of the country is almost at a standstill.(69) 
 
Sovdepia was said to be 'entirely cut off from the rest of the world', leaving the public in receipt of 
'entirely distorted news' about world affairs from the Soviet press and creating 'a state of general mental 
depression and a feeling of the hopelessness of any struggle against Bolshevism'. This was 'one of the 
greatest dangers of the present situation in Russia', according to Reilly, who urged the prompt liberation 
of the population of Sovdepia 'through the Allies and the armies of Denikin and Kolchak', warning that 'as 
time passes and no help is forthcoming, even the staunchest lose heart, and this hopelessness and the 
terrible conditions of life force many to join the Bolcheviks and thereby still more increase their 
power'.(70) 
 
Before leaving Sevastopol, Reilly prepared two further despatches on matters relating to Denikin's 
Volunteers. The first of these despatches (Number 11) was completed on 30 January and revealed the 
existence of 'a good deal of disappointment and ill feeling in Russian Naval circles at the attitude of 
Allied Naval Commands towards the Russian Navy'. White naval officers were indignant because the 
recent effort by Admiral Kanin to establish a small Volunteer Fleet in the Black Sea had been thwarted, 
Reilly explained, when the 'most seaworthy vessels were taken over by the Allied Commands and led 
away to Constantinople'. Repeated requests to Constantinople from the Whites for the return of these 
Russian vessels had been fruitless. 'Apart from the fact that there can be no valid reason for acts which 
may be interpreted as affronts to Russian National pride', Reilly argued, 'it would seem that the tendency 
on the part of Russian naval officers to regenerate their Fleet or to save what is left of it, is a healthy 
symptom which is worthy of encouragement'.(71) The Allies did not agree, however, as Denikin later 
recalled, noting: 'It was only in the autumn that the whole of the captured fleet was returned to us by the 
Allies'.(72) Nor were they concerned, apparently, at actions on their part, albeit in their interests, being 
interpreted as affronts to the national pride of the Whites in South Russia, for whom Great Russia was a 
particular source of inspiration. 
 
  
 
 
The other despatch (Number 12), dated 2 February, submitted evidence of a contemptuous attitude 
towards the Volunteer Army on the part of Captain Roydes RN, commanding the cruiser HMS 
Canterbury. With a covering letter to the Foreign Secretary, Reilly enclosed a copy of a report to General 
Denikin from the Volunteer Army's representative in the Crimea, Colonel Baron Nolken, criticising 'the 
Captain of the "Canterbury", who took up an attitude of clearly unfriendly feelings to the Volunteer Army 
and had an entirely untrue idea about it ...'.(73) Despite his already well-documented position as a staunch 
advocate of the Volunteer Army, Reilly did not comment directly on this particular report, though he gave 
the author his wholehearted endorsement, declaring: 'I know Baron Nolken well and have the highest 
opinion of his integrity'.(74) Roydes was rather exceptional in British naval and military circles for his 
allegedly unfriendly attitude to the Volunteer Army at this time. Nevertheless, his opinion of the 
Volunteers was based largely on impressions gained from the observation of their contingents in the 
Ukraine and, as Reilly would soon discover, reflected very closely the attitude of the French Command in 
Odessa towards these same contingents in particular, as well as the Volunteer Army in general. 
 
Although Reilly had reported in detail on the state of affairs in the Crimea, Kuban and Don, he did not 
consider himself to be 'sufficiently versed in Caucasian politics' to comment on the situation there.(75) 
But he felt no such inhibition about developments in the Ukraine, where direct military intervention by 
Allied forces under French command had been underway since December 1918. He was well placed to 
observe these developments following his arrival in Odessa with Hill early in February 1919. By this 
time, there were about 12 000 Allied troops in and around Odessa, made up of a Polish brigade, two 
Greek divisions and one and a half divisions of French and Colonial troops.(76) Hill's stay there was only 
transitory, as he departed for London on 5 February carrying Reilly's 12 completed despatches for 
delivery to the Foreign Office.(77) Meanwhile, Reilly directed his attention primarily to proceedings 
within the French zone of occupation in the Ukraine. Between 18 February and 7 March, after which he 
left Odessa for Constantinople, Reilly prepared a total of eight dispatches, reporting on various aspects of 
the French-led intervention in this particular region.(78) 
 
These despatches, which he had transmitted by telegraph to London by arrangement with John Picton 
Bagge, showed Reilly to be anything but impressed with the French authorities in charge of this venture. 
In his judgement, they were responsible for having 'converted Odessa into one of the worst administered 
and least safe of cities in the world'. He also attacked their efforts to negotiate an agreement with the 
Ukrainian Directorate, declaring that there could be 'no justification' for such action since, 'after the fall of 
Kieff, directory lost every shade of military and political power and to negotiate with it was equivalent to 
negotiating with a corpse.'(79) For the French, of course, these negotiations seemed justified to the extent 
that, initially, they had brought an end to the Petlyurists' blockade of Odessa and achieved without 
conflict the subsequent deployment inland of Allied troops.(80) But, as Reilly reported a short time later, 
when the Reds began their advance southwards in the Ukraine early in March 1919, the Petlyurists 
'demobilised themselves', leaving the Allied forces to face the Red onslaught with the Volunteers as their 
only support.(81) 
 
  
 
 
The 'decidedly unfriendly' attitude shown towards the Volunteer Army by the local French Command 
under General Philippe d'Anselme was another matter disturbing to Reilly.(82) In this regard, he was 
particularly critical of General d'Anselme's Chief-of-Staff, Colonel Henri Freydenberg, accusing him of 
deliberate obstruction of the Volunteers' efforts locally to supply, mobilise and operate their own forces 
and, also, of treating 'Russian staff officers with a total lack of elementary courtesy and even with 
insulting rudeness'. Such was the effect of this officer's behaviour that Reilly specifically recommended 
his 'prompt removal' as a measure which would do 'more than anything else to re-establish workable 
relations between French and volunteer army'.(83) A rupture with the Volunteers was inevitable 
according to Reilly, 'unless French adopt more straightforward and far-seeing policy'.(84) In his opinion, 
such a policy should encourage 'frank and cordial cooperation between French and Volunteer Army and 
... coordination of their military and administrative activities'.(85) French persistence with the current 
policy merely 'plays into hands of Bolsheviks and Germans', he warned, 'and must result in disaster'.(86) 
Disaster threatened too in the weakening commitment to intervention of the Allied forces in the Ukraine, 
particularly the French units, which Reilly observed to be so poor in spirit that General d'Anselme 'on 
several occasions admitted that his troops are reluctant to fight'.(87) The threat of disaster would soon 
become a reality, with Allied garrisons being forced to evacuate Kherson and Nikolaev on 10 and 12 
March respectively, leading to another blockade of Odessa, albeit by the Reds this time, and ultimately to 
the complete evacuation of Allied forces from the city by 6 April.(88) 
 
When the Assistant British High Commissioner to Constantinople, Rear-Admiral Richard Webb, read 
Reilly's despatches together with messages from Bagge independently reflecting the same views, he found 
in them 'such disquieting reports ... regarding situation in South Russia and especially as regards relations 
between volunteer army and French authorities that requested him [Bagge] to come here accompanied by 
Mr. Reilly to give me a personal account'. What Webb heard in conference with Bagge and Reilly on 10 
March gave him 'so grave a view of situation', that he arranged Reilly's immediate departure for London 
so the MI6 agent could provide the Foreign Office with a 'full personal account'.(89) This initiative on 
Webb's part was a fortuitous circumstance for Reilly, who had requested himself on 21 February 'that I be 
ordered to return home as my further stay here is waste of time and only verbal reports can elucidate the 
intricate situation'.(90) Reilly reached London around 20 March, duly reported to the Foreign Office and 
then left shortly afterwards for Paris, where he arrived on 30 March. After a brief stay in the French 
capital, during which he met Winston Churchill for the first time and also conferred with members of the 
British Peace Delegation about the situation in South Russia, Reilly left France by ship to join his wife in 
the United States. He would return to Russia only once more, crossing the Finnish border on 25 
September 1925 and proceeding via Leningrad to Moscow, where the secret police (Unified State 
Political Directorate or OGPU) took him into custody. According to Soviet sources, he was interrogated 
by the OGPU and then executed on 5 November 1925.(91) Thus, Sidney Reilly's life in secret service for 
Britain and the anti-Bolshevik cause was ended, and the legend of the master spy began. 
 
  
 
 
Reaction at the Foreign Office to Reilly's reports on South Russia was generally quite favourable. His 
telegraphed despatches from Odessa had begun arriving in London from 20 February, providing harsh but 
largely justified criticism of the French authorities in charge of the Ukrainian intervention and 
forewarning the Foreign Office of the disaster that was about to befall this venture. These despatches were 
adjudged of sufficient significance by the Foreign Office for copies of at least some of them to be 
circulated for information to the King and War Cabinet.(92) As for the 12 despatches in the consignment 
delivered by Hill on 1 March, Walford Selby recorded on behalf of the Russia Department that they 
'contain a fund of useful information on the subject of the whole situation in South Russia ...'. Rex Leeper 
of the Political Intelligence Department expressed his satisfaction overall with Reilly's despatches from 
South Russia with the notation: 'His reports have always been very interesting & reliable & ... give us the 
political information we require'. Yet Smith-Cumming's declared intention in sending Reilly and Hill to 
South Russia in the first place had been to obtain information to assist British preparations for the Paris 
Peace Conference. According to Selby, however, even before the receipt of Reilly's despatches at the 
Foreign Office, the British Peace Delegation in Paris had already based its position concerning the 
military, economic and financial aspects of the South Russian situation largely on Colonel Blackwood's 
earlier report to the War Office.(93) This only left the political aspects for consideration, in respect of 
which Reilly had recommended the appointment of a British High Commissioner to South Russia - 
something that he discussed personally in Paris with members of the British Peace Delegation, but which 
would not be considered necessary by the Foreign Secretary for many months to come.(94) So, contrary 
to MI6's original expectation, Reilly's mission to South Russia seems to have been of little consequence as 
far as British preparations for the Peace Conference were concerned. But, regardless, the Foreign Office 
obviously was still a well satisfied recipient of his reports from this region. Indeed, George Hill soon 
returned there to carry on the work begun by Reilly, and would continue to do so until December 1919, 
when he took up the post of Intelligence Officer with the newly appointed British High Commissioner to 
South Russia, Halford John Mackinder.(95) 
 
At first glance, Reilly might appear to have played an uncharacteristically passive hand in South Russia, 
by merely reporting on the situation there as he found it. But, in fact, he took a particularly active role on 
himself as an unashamed advocate of Denikin, the Volunteer Army and their quest for a united Great 
Russia, even distorting information to some extent to advance their claim to primacy over the anti-
Bolshevik movement in Russia. Certainly, he did not disregard or attempt to disguise the many 
weaknesses and faults of the Volunteer Army. Nevertheless, Denikin and his Volunteers were acclaimed 
by Reilly to be universally recognised by constructive political opinion in Russia as the only possible 
source of military and political leadership in the struggle against Bolshevism. In attacking Krasnov and 
the various separatist elements in South Russia who opposed Denikin's leadership of this struggle, Reilly 
repeated the standard Volunteer criticisms of them as pro-German, pro-Bolshevik or simply personally 
ambitious. Surprisingly too, he echoed the anti-semitic sentiment so prevalent in the Volunteer camp, in 
blaming the influence of elements described as 'mostly Jewish and ... pro-German' for the disdainful 
attitude towards the Volunteers of the French Command in Odessa.(96) Clearly, these were the 
characteristics of a zealous advocate of the Volunteers and their cause, rather than a disinterested 
intelligence agent reporting conscientiously on the state of affairs that he found in South Russia. 
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